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Abstract: The causes and consequences of corruption have attracted much attention in
recent years by both academics and policy makers. Central in the discussion on the
impact of corruption are perception-based indices. While informative, these indices are
ordinal in nature and hence provide no indication of how much economic loss is attributed
to corruption. Arguably, this shortcoming is rooted in the lack of a structural model.
This is the issue addressed in this paper. By treating corruption as a latent variable that
is directly related to its underlying causes, a cardinal index of corruption is derived for
approximately 100 countries. This allows us to compute a measure of the losses due to
corruption as a percentage of GDP per capita.
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Corruption around the world is believed to be endemic and pervasive and a signiﬁcant
contributor to low economic growth, to stiﬂe investment, to inhibit the provision of public
services and to increase inequality to such an extent that international organizations like
the World Bank have identiﬁed corruption as ‘the single greatest obstacle to economic
and social development’ (World Bank, 2001).1;2 More recently, the World Bank has
estimated that more than US$ 1 trillion is paid in bribes each year and that countries
that tackle corruption, improve governance and the rule of law could increase per capita
incomes by a staggering 400 percent (World Bank, 2004). Commensurate with the place
of corruption on the policy agenda, the economics literature has paid increased attention
to the issue of corruption.3 Though the recent literature is mainly theoretical in focus,
there have also been attempts – albeit relatively few in number – to address the causes
and consequences of corruption from an empirical standpoint. Notable eﬀorts in this
area include, among others, Mauro (1995) on the impact of corruption on economic
growth and investment, Treisman (2000) on the causes of corruption and Fisman and
Gatti (2002) on the links between political structure and corruption.
Corruption is a variable that cannot be measured directly. However, in recent years,
several organizations have developed a corruption perceptions index across a wide range
of countries to qualitatively assess the pervasiveness of corruption. These indices have
been used in econometric studies (including the ones mentioned above) either as a de-
pendent variable when exploring the causes of corruption or as an explanatory variable
when investigating its consequences. Undoubtedly, these perception-based indices have
made an important contribution to the understanding of the pervasiveness of corruption
across countries. They are, however, not free of problems. One such problem arises from
the ordinality of the indices and therefore with the diﬃculty of assigning a meaningful
economic interpretation to them. Clearly, this shortcoming is rooted in the lack of a
structural model encompassing the underlying causes of corruption.4 It is this issue that
this paper deals with.
1This argument, though, is not supported unanimously. Routine corruption may have the desirable
property of creating incentives for public employees. For an early statement of this argument see Leﬀ
(1964), Morgan (1964), and Lui (1985). For a criticism of this view see Tanzi (1998), Kaufmann and
Wei (1999), and Rose-Ackerman (1999).
2The deﬁnition of corruption varies widely. The most widespread one seems to be the misuse of
public oﬃce for private gain, Rose-Ackerman (1999).
3Bardhan (1997), Jain (2001), and Aidt (2003) provide comprehensive accounts of the latest devel-
opments on corruption. See also Rose-Ackerman (1978, 1999), and Lambsdorﬀ (1999).
4Other problems exist. See, for instance, Andvig et. al. (2000), and Kaufmann et. al. (2003).
1In particular, we estimate corruption employing a special case of a structural equation
model, the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model, introduced to economics
by Weck (1983), and Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984) and latterly explored by Loayza
(1996) and Giles (1999), among others, to measure the size of the hidden economy,5
Raiser et. al. (2000) to investigate the institutional change in Eastern Europe, and
Kuklys (2004) to measure welfare.
Based on a sample of around 100 countries, we derive an index of corruption based
on estimated parameters that relate directly to its causes and indicators. There are
two key advantages to this approach of measuring corruption. First, the ranking of
countries in our index is based on a structural relationship between causes and indicators
of corruption and it is – reﬂecting the structural variables – cardinal. The cardinal nature
of the index, in turn, allows the pervasiveness of corruption across the countries in the
sample to be expressed as a percentage of GDP per capita.6 This provides a more direct
measure of how signiﬁcant corruption is as a policy issue. Second, since we have, albeit
limited, data on the causes and indicators of corruption dating back to the 1970s, we
can re-estimate the model for diﬀerent time periods allowing us to address the question
of whether corruption has increased or decreased since the late 1970s.
The key results are as follows. Firstly, the estimated model produces cardinal cross-
countries indexes (and so a ranking) of corruption based on the structural relationship
between the variables that cause and indicate corruption from the mid-1970s to the late
1990’s. The resulting ranking of countries is not surprising with the developed countries
reported as having lower corruption than the developing ones. The estimates show that
in 1997 Switzerland was the least corrupt country followed by Japan, Norway, Denmark,
Germany and the Netherlands. The US is in 9th position followed by France and Bel-
gium. The most corrupt countries are (in reverse order) Zambia, Ghana, the Central
Africa Republic, Syria, Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau, the most corrupt country. Secondly,
and perhaps more importantly, we conﬁrm that corruption is indeed a signiﬁcant prob-
lem with the losses due to corruption as a percentage of per capita GDP being high
particularly in developing countries. On average, relatively low losses arise from corrup-
tion in developed countries but with higher losses in Latin America and Asia and, in
particular, sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in the 1991-1997 period, the losses due to
corruption are estimated to be 11.2 percent of GDP per capita for Norway while the
losses for Nigeria and Guinea-Bissau are 66.05 and 66.79 percent of GDP per capita,
5Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002) oﬀer a comprehensive account of studies on the hidden economy
that have employed this approach.
6This is being done by appropriately benchmarking the index on proxies for corruption. We return
to this is detail in Section 5.
2respectively. The losses due to corruption in Western Europe average 22.26 percent of
per capita GDP. In East Asia and Paciﬁc, Middle East and North Africa, Latin Amer-
ica and Caribbean, South Asia and sub-Saharan-Africa they average 39.7, 54.26, 57.74,
62.77 and 63.23 percent, respectively. The other periods exhibit the same trend.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the MIMIC methodology to measure
corruption as a latent variable is presented. In Section 3, data on the causes and indi-
cators of corruption are discussed. In Section 4, the results from the estimated MIMIC
model and the index of corruption across countries are presented and in Section 5 the
associated economic losses of corruption are reported. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude
with some observations on the relevance of the results for further empirical research on
corruption.
2 A structural equation model for corruption
We focus on the MIMIC model that is characterized by a latent endogenous variable
with no measurement error in the independent variables. The unknown coeﬃcients of
the model are estimated separately through a set of structural equations with the indi-
cator variables being used to capture the eﬀect of the unobserved variables indirectly.
Using causal and indicator variables of corruption across countries, the structural model
can be estimated and, in turn, a cardinal index of corruption across countries retrieved.
Moreover, by appropriately benchmarking this index, a measure of the eﬀect of corrup-
tion as a percentage of GDP per capita across our sample countries and across time
periods can be derived.
More formally, but brieﬂy,7 the speciﬁcation of the MIMIC model is as follows. Let yi,
i = 1;:::;n, be one of the indicators of the latent random variable corruption, denoted
by ´, such that
y1 = °1 ´ + u1;:::;yn = °n ´ + un ; (1)
where °i is the factor loading8 and ui, i = 1;:::;n, are the error terms with mean zero
and covariance matrix Θu. The disturbances are mutually independent such that any
correlation across the indicators are driven by the common factor ´. Equation (1) is,
then, a conﬁrmatory factor analysis model for the observable indicators y = (y1;:::;yn)0
with common factor ´ and unique factor ui, i = 1;:::;n. The latent variable ´ is
7See J¨ oreskog and Goldberg (1975) for the original contribution to estimating the MIMIC model
with a single latent variable and Bollen (1989) for a more accessible, but thorough, treatment.
8A factor loading represents the expected change in the respective indicators following a one unit
change in the latent variable.
3linearly determined by a set of exogenous variables (causes) given by x = (x1;:::;xk)0
and a stochastic disturbance ², that is
´ = ¯
0x + ² ; (2)
where ¯ = (¯1;:::;¯k)0. The model, therefore, comprises of two parts: the measure-
ment model in equation (1) which speciﬁes how the observed endogenous variables are
determined by the latent variable and the structural equation model, equation (2), which
speciﬁes the relationship between the latent variable and its causes.
Since the latent variable ´ is unobserved it is impossible to recover direct estimates of the
structural parameters ¯. Substituting (2) into (1), the MIMIC model can be interpreted
as a multivariate regression model that takes the reduced form, connecting the observable
variables, given by
y = Π
0x + z ; (3)
where the reduced-form coeﬃcient matrix is Π = °¯
0, where ° = (°1;:::;°n)0, and the
reduced-form disturbance vector is z = °² + u, with covariance matrix




² + Θu ; (4)
where ¾2
² is the variance of the disturbance ². Clearly, the rank of the reduced form
regression matrix Π, in (3), is equal to 1. The error covariance matrix Θ², being the sum
of a rank-one matrix and a diagonal matrix, is also similarly constrained. This property
calls for a normalization of one of the elements of the vector ° to a pre-speciﬁed value
prior to the estimation of the reduced form of the model. The fundamental hypothesis
for a structural equation model is that the covariance matrix of the observed variables,
S, may be parameterized based upon a given model speciﬁcation with parameter vector
±. The model parameters, under normality, are estimated based upon minimizing the
function
F = lnjΣ(±)j + trfSΣ
¡1(±)g ¡ lnjSj ¡ ½ ; (5)
where S is the sample covariance matrix of the observed variables, Σ
¡1 is the estimated
population covariance matrix and ½ = k + n is the number of measured variables.
Once the hypothesized relationship between the variables has been identiﬁed and es-
timated, the latent variable scores ´j for each country j = 1;:::J can be obtained
following the procedure suggested by J¨ oreskog (2000).9 Clearly, then, the challenge in
implementing this framework is to identify the relationship amongst the variables. This,
together with data issues, is discussed in the following section.
9While this provides a ranking of corruption across countries, to provide an estimate of the economic
losses associated with corruption across all countries in our sample, we must benchmark the value of
this index on an external source, (Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984), and Loayza (1996)). We return
to this in Section 5.
43 Causes and indicators of corruption
3.1 Causes of corruption
To identify the hypothesized variables that relate to the causes and indicators of corrup-
tion we draw on the theoretical and empirical literature on this topic. We start with a
discussion of the causal variables and then turn to the variables that have been used as
indicators. To ease the exposition the causal variables have been categorized into four
main factor-groups namely: political and judicial factors; historical factors; social and
cultural factors, and economic factors.10
3.1.1 Political factors
The political factors capture the democratic environment of a given country, the eﬀec-
tiveness of its judicial system and the origin of its legal system. The role of democracy
has been highlighted in several studies of corruption (see, among others, Treisman (2000),
and Paldam (2003)). It is widely believed that corruption is related to the deﬁciencies of
the political system and that democracy, by promoting political competition and hence
increasing transparency and accountability, can provide a check, albeit an imperfect
one, on corruption. Other characteristics of the political environment, including elec-
toral rules (Persson et. al. (2003)) and the degree of decentralization (Treisman (2000),
and Fisman and Gatti (2002)) may also be important in explaining corruption.11
The judicial system is also expected to play a role in controlling corruption (Becker
(1968)). The role of the legal system and the rule of law have featured prominently in
many recent studies on the quality of governance and its consequences for development
(see, for example, North (1990), and Easterly and Levine (1997)). Strong legal foun-
dations and eﬃcient legal systems with well-speciﬁed deterrents protect property rights
and so provide a stable framework for economic activity. Failure of the legal system to
provide for the enforcement of contracts undermines the operation of the free market
and, in turn, reduces the incentives for agents to participate in productive activities.
But legal systems may diﬀer in the degree to which property rights are protected and in
the quality of government they provide. Empirical work suggests that the common law
system, mostly found in the former colonies of Britain, appear to have better protection
of property rights compared with the civil law system typically associated with the for-
mer colonies of continental Europe (see, for example, La Porta et. al. (1999)). Political
10The speciﬁc data employed in our modelling eﬀort is discussed in Section 4. Description of all the
variables that have been tried, and their sources, can be found in the appendix.
11To be more precise, since the measure of corruption is based on the perception-based indices dis-
cussed above, these studies investigate whether the structure of the political system leads to higher
levels of perceived corruption.
5instability may also matter for corruption, the expectation being that more unstable
countries will have higher levels of perceived corruption.12
3.1.2 Historical factors
To a large extent, it is diﬃcult to separate the historical factors from the political and
judicial factors since the eﬀectiveness of the judicial system is dependent on the colonial
heritage of the country in question. La Porta et. al. (1999) show that those countries
that were former colonies of Britain and who adopted the common law system appear to
have more eﬀective judicial systems than those who adopted civil law systems associated
with former colonies of continental European countries. Treisman (2000) also explores
the direct inﬂuence of historical tradition on perceived corruption showing that former
British colonies or dominions appear to reduce perceived corruption in excess of the role
played by the common law system.
3.1.3 Social and cultural factors
This group of factors captures the social and cultural characteristics of a country that
may impact upon the pervasiveness of corruption in a given country. For example,
religion shapes social attitudes towards social hierarchy and family values and thus may
determine the acceptability, or otherwise, of corrupt practices. In more hierarchical
systems (for example, Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam), challenges to the
status quo are less frequent than in more equalitarian or individualistic religions. The
role of the religious tradition and corruption has been explored explicitly by Treisman
(2000) who found that a Protestant tradition appears to have a negative (though small)
eﬀect on perceived corruption. Religion may also impact on the quality of the legal
system, as explored by La Porta et. al. (1999). They found that countries with a high
proportion of Catholics or Muslims reduces the quality of government and, by extension,
may reduce the deterrence of corruption. Religious fractionalization may also have an
impact on corruption and other characteristics associated with the quality of government
(Alesina et. al. (2003)).
Ethnic and linguistic fractionalization of a society may also contribute to the perva-
siveness of corruption in a given country. The evidence is, however, mixed. Treisman
(2000) found no evidence that linguistic fractionalization had a direct impact on per-
ceived corruption, while La Porta et. al. (1999) found evidence that, in societies that
were more ethno-linguistically diverse, governments exhibited inferior performance. More
recently, Alesina et. al. (2003) have presented evidence that ethnic and linguistic frac-
12Treisman (2000), however, ﬁnds little support for this.
6tionalization has a statistically signiﬁcant impact on corruption i.e. countries that are
ethno-linguistically diverse are associated with higher perceived levels of corruption.
3.1.4 Economic factors
The economic determinants of corruption across countries have focussed typically on
three factors: the degree of openness, a country’s endowments of natural resources and
the size of the public sector. Less open countries restrict trade and impose controls on
capital ﬂows. This creates rents and hence enhances the incentives to engage in corrupt
activities. There are a number of papers that have investigated this issue: for example,
Ades and Di Tella (1999) have shown that increased competition reduces corruption
and that more open economies are less corrupt. Treisman (2000) has shown that higher
imports lowers corruption. Wei and Wu (2001) have presented evidence that countries
with capital controls have higher corruption and, in turn, receive less foreign investment
and are more prone to ﬁnancial crisis. More recently, Neeman et. al. (2003) have
shown that the eﬀect of corruption on economic growth depends on the openness of the
economy.13
Natural resource endowments have also featured in cross-country studies of corruption,
the justiﬁcation here being that the concentration of exports on natural resources is a
proxy for rent-seeking opportunities. Ades and Di Tella (1999) suggest that corruption
may oﬀer greater gain to oﬃcials who exercise control over the distribution of the rights
to exploit these natural resources. Treisman (2000) ﬁnds that a higher concentration of
natural resource exports has a positive eﬀect on perceived corruption.
Several studies on the causes of corruption have emphasised the size of the public sector.
Tanzi (1998), for instance, notes that the signiﬁcant role of the public sector in the
economy aﬀords public oﬃcials some degree of discretion in the allocation of goods and
services provided and hence increases the likelihood of corruption. This mechanism is
reinforced if the wages public oﬃcials receive are relatively low. This issue is explored
by van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) who ﬁnd that low wages for civil servants have a
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on (perceived) corruption. Treisman (2000), however, ﬁnds
rather inconclusive evidence of the size of the public sector in inﬂuencing corruption
across countries.
We now turn to a discussion of the possible indicators of the structural model.
13Neeman et. al. (2003) suggest that higher levels of openness is more likely to increase the impact
of corruption as openness will allow for the dissipation of stolen money abroad. However, while they
use an overall index of openness, the mechanism for whether corruption will have this eﬀect is primarily
limited to restrictions on the capital account.
73.2 Indicators of corruption
While the existing literature oﬀers suﬃcient guidance as to the causal variables to be used
as determinants of corruption, less guidance is available in the appropriate indicators.
The challenge, therefore, is to select variables that appear to be correlated with the
pervasiveness of corruption across the countries on our sample. This, as emphasized
above, will enable us to estimate the MIMIC model and retrieve a measure of the latent
variable. While there are a large number of candidate variables, we report only those
that were successful in our modelling eﬀort.14
Naturally, the most obvious indicator variable that should be incorporated into the
structural model is GDP per capita. Almost all available evidence would appear to
suggest that corruption varies inversely with development (see, among others, Mauro
(1995), and Paldam (2003)). Capital control restrictions are also included as an indicator
variable. As noted in the discussion above, countries less open to foreign trade appear
to be correlated with high levels of corruption.15 More speciﬁcally, recent studies have
noted that countries appearing to exhibit relatively high levels of corruption are more
likely to impose capital account restrictions (Wei and Wu (2001), and Dreher and Siemers
(2003)). Recent empirical studies on the consequences of corruption have also focused on
the allocation of resources, emphasizing not only the negative impact of corruption on
investment but also its negative impact on the composition of investment. Mauro (1997)
argues that the allocation of public procurement contracts through a corrupt system will
lead to lower quality public services and quality of infrastructure.16 A natural variable
that captures the distortion of corruption on the allocation of resources is a measure of
ﬁnancial development. One would expect, in the absence of a well-developed ﬁnancial
sector, that corruption would be particularly distorting relative to those countries where
a highly developed ﬁnancial sector is present. Along these lines, Hillman and Krausz
(2004) argue that corruption provides the source of the ineﬀectiveness of the ﬁnancial
system by reducing the volume of ﬁnancial intermediation. Following Claessens and
Laeven (2003), ﬁnancial development is proxied by private credit as a share of GDP.
The ﬁnal indicator variable uses apparent consumption of cement and endeavors to cap-
ture projects where the scope for corruption is high. As noted by Mauro (1997), lucrative
14Indicator variables that were tried, but without success, include, among others, growth of GDP,
growth of GDP per capita, public investment as a share of GDP and trade as a percentage of GDP.
Naturally, the size of the shadow economy may also be a good candidate as an indicator of corruption.
Since such data are not available for a suﬃcient number of countries and periods, it is not used in the
paper. This is also true for military spending as a percentage of GDP.
15As noted in the previous footnote, the level of trade (imports and exports) as a share of GDP was
tried as an indicator variable but without much success.
16See also Rose-Ackerman (1999), and Tanzi (1998).
8opportunities for corruption typically arise with large projects the exact value of which
are diﬃcult to monitor. It is also easier to collect bribes on large infrastructure projects
or on military expenditure.17 In addition, data from the Bribe Payers Index shows that
sectors where corrupt practices are likely to be higher include public works contracts
and construction. Rose-Ackerman (1999, pp. 30-31) provides direct justiﬁcation for the
use of cement consumption as an indicator variable noting that: ‘In Nigeria in 1975, the
military government ordered cement that totalled two-thirds of the estimated needs of all
of Africa and which exceeded the productive capacity of Western Europe and the Soviet
Union’. Supportive of this is also della Porta and Vannucci (1997) who note that per
capita cement consumption in Italy (a country that is perceived to be high on corruption
indices) has been double that of the US and triple that of the UK and Germany. It seems,
therefore, that cement is a natural proxy for large-scale projects. Given this evidence
and the results from the Bribe Payers Index, we collected data on total consumption
of cement for all the countries in our sample. To account for the role of development,
this consumption data was expressed as a percentage of GDP. In addition, to account
for the distribution of the population, this data was also adjusted for the density of the
population.
Before turning to the results a word of clariﬁcation is in order. Given that the latent
variable is intrinsically uncertain one may, naturally, ask whether this variable does in-
deed measure corruption. The answer to this question is, with a good degree of certainty,
aﬃrmative. This is because,18 as the results presented below show, the derived index is
highly correlated with the perception-based indices that are widely reported and so – to
the extent that perception-based indices are correctly reporting cross-country corruption




We initially estimated the model for the 1991-1997 period covering between 98 and 103
countries.19 The time period was restricted to the cut-oﬀ year 1997 because of unavail-
ability of more recent data for the causal and indicator variables. We took the mean
17As noted in footnote 14, military expenditure – being unavailable for the whole period – has not be
included in the set of estimated variables.
18Leaving aside that the goodness-of-ﬁt-statistics of the models, discussed in Section 4, and the fact
that, as emphasized already, all indexes presented make use of well documented variables that relate to
corruption.
19All estimations have been performed with LISRELr V. 8.5.4.
9values of the available data over this period. In estimating the model, we used data
that relate directly to the causes of corruption outlined in the previous section.20 Since
we estimate the model over diﬀerent sub-periods, we include only those variables where
data was available from the 1970s to the 1990s.21 For the political factors, we used the
following: whether the country was a democracy; the period of uninterrupted demo-
cratic government; number of years in oﬃce of the incumbent government; the rule of
law; whether the political system was presidential; fractionalization of elected parties;
whether the political system was federal; extent of decentralization; degree of political
stability; freedom of the press and the school enrolment rate. The latter variable is used
by Treisman (2000) who argues that corruption will be lower where populations are more
educated and literate and where the normative separation between ‘public’ and ‘private’
is clearer. In a similar vein, Knack et. al. (2003) suggest that education and literacy
act as a vertical check on government. For social and cultural factors we used data on:
the dominant religion in each country; the extent of religious fractionalization; whether
English was the dominant language; the degree of linguistic fractionalization and eth-
nic fractionalization. Historical causes included the following: legal origin; whether the
country is a former colony of Britain; whether a common or civil law system applies;
settler mortality and latitude. Variables used to capture the economic causes of corrup-
tion included: trade as a percentage of GDP; natural resource exports as a percentage
of merchandize exports and the size of the public sector. Making use of these variables,
a number of speciﬁcations have been tested. In what follows, the discussion is conﬁned
to those variables which are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
The results are presented in Table 1. Starting with the indicator variables, it can be seen
that they are fairly consistent across all model speciﬁcations. As pointed out in Section 2,
one of the coeﬃcients of the indicators must be normalized for the estimated parameters
to be identiﬁed. The choice of the indicator on which to normalize the latent variable
has to be the one that best represents the underlying construct. We have therefore
normalized the estimated parameters with respect to cement consumption (see below).
All indicator variables are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level and have the
anticipated sign, with cement consumption being positively and ﬁnancial development
negatively related to corruption, respectively. Lower levels of GDP per capita and more
restrictions on the capital account are also associated with higher corruption.
20Prior to estimation the data is standardized; this is a common procedure in estimating MIMIC
models. We also tested each speciﬁcation for multivariate normality. In those cases where transforma-
tions have been necessary, in order for the data to satisfy the multivariate normality assumption, the
transformed data produced similar results.
21Since the objective is to provide a model that would be comparable across sub-periods, variables
with data available only for recent years, or a sub-set of countries, have been excluded.
10Turning to the causal variables, the results show that the rule of law has a negative eﬀect
on corruption that is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level across all speciﬁcations.
School enrolment, too, reduces corruption and so – recalling that school enrolment can
be interpreted as a proxy for the eﬀectiveness of democracy in a given country – countries
with weak democratic institutions will be expected to have higher levels of corruption.
This coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level in the speciﬁcations reported in
columns 1 and 2, while it is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level in speciﬁcations 3 and 4.
Columns 1 and 4 include latitude (a variable with ambiguous economic interpretation).
At the 10 percent level of signiﬁcance, latitude reduces corruption. Columns 2 and 4
also include a dummy for German legal origin, while the age of democracy is included
in columns 3 and 4. Both variables negatively aﬀect corruption at the 5 percent level of
signiﬁcance.22
It can be diﬃcult to compare the eﬀects of two or more variables when they have diﬀerent
units of measurement. Standardized coeﬃcients can be useful in interpreting the relative
eﬀects of diﬀerent explanatory variables.23 The standardized coeﬃcient is the expected
change in standard deviation units of the latent variable when the other variables are
held constant. According to the standardized coeﬃcients of the full model (not reported
in the Table) of column 4, a one standard deviation increase in the rule of law leads to a
reduction in corruption by 0.20 standard deviations. A one standard deviation increase
in the school enrolment rate, latitude, and the age of democracy reduces corruption by
0.32, 0.12 and, 0.32 standard deviations, respectively.
Table 1 also reports goodness-of-ﬁt statistics for the four model speciﬁcations. The chi-
square test of exact ﬁt accepts all models at least at the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance.24
The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) accounts for the error of
approximation in the population and has recently been recognized as one of the most
informative criteria in covariance structure modelling (Steiger, 1990).25 The RMSEA
22When including non-continuous variables, the estimator is no longer consistent, Bollen (1989). This,
however, does not seem to impose any problems here. The results are very similar when legal German
origin is excluded from estimation. Note that the index of restrictions is continuous due to averaging
and standardizing.
23These standardized coeﬃcients are deﬁned as ˆ °s
ij = ˆ °ij
p
ˆ ¾jj=ˆ ¾ii, and ˆ ¯s
ij = ˆ ¯ij
p
ˆ ¾jj=ˆ ¾ii where the
subscript s denotes the standardized coeﬃcient, i is the ‘dependent’ variable, j is the ‘independent’ and p
ˆ ¾jj,
p
ˆ ¾ii are the model-predicted variances of the jth and ith variables, respectively.
24The chi-square statistic tests the speciﬁcation of the model against the alternative that the co-
variance matrix of the observed variables is unconstrained, where smaller values indicate a better ﬁt.
In other words, a small chi-square does not reject the null hypothesis that the model reproduces the
covariance matrix.
25Expressed diﬀerently, the RMSEA measures how well the model ﬁts based on the diﬀerence between
the estimated and the actual covariance matrix (and degrees of freedom). Values of the RMSEA less
11is smaller than 0.05 in the most recent period and still acceptable in the other three
speciﬁcations. Other indices providing evidence of an acceptable ﬁt are the Goodness
of Fit Index (GFI), the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) and the Normed Fit
Index (NFI). These indices range from zero to one, with values close to one indicating
a better ﬁt.26 The estimated latent variable explains 92 percent of the variance of
cement consumption, 33 percent of private credit, 0.06 percent of per capita GDP, and
0.47 percent of capital account restrictions. Based on these goodness-of-ﬁt statistics we
conclude that the model ﬁts the data fairly well.
The next step is to derive the ranking for the countries in the sample in terms of their
expected levels of corruption.27 The results for the full model are reported in the ﬁrst
column of Table 2. The ranking, to a large extent, is not surprising, the developed
countries being typically reported as countries with lower corruption and developing
countries with higher corruption. The world’s least corrupt country is Switzerland,
followed by Japan, Norway, Denmark, and Germany. With the exception of Japan,
Singapore and the US, only Western European countries are among the 15 least corrupt
nations. At the bottom of the scale, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Syria, and the Central
African Republic are found to be most corrupt. As can be seen, sub-Saharan African
countries dominate the bottom of the scale, with the exception of Syria, Ukraine, and
Romania. Latin American and Caribbean countries can be found at ranks between
31-71. To get a better understanding of those regional diﬀerences, we also calculated
average corruption indices according to region. Corruption is by far lowest in Western
Europe, with an average index of -0.36. The ranking for the other regions is as follows:
East Asia Paciﬁc (-0.05), Middle East and North Africa (0.16), Latin America and
Caribbean (0.22), East Europe and Central Asia (0.26), sub-Saharan Africa (0.29) and
South Asia (0.29). Within Western Europe, Greece is the most corrupt country followed
by Portugal and Cyprus. The most corrupt South Asian countries are Papua New
Guinea, Philippines, and China. In the Middle East and North Africa, Kuwait and Israel
are the least, and Syria and Algeria the most, corrupt countries. The least corrupt sub-
Saharan Africa country is South Africa. In what follows, we will explore the developments
than 0.05 indicate good ﬁt, values as high as 0.08 represent reasonable ﬁt, values from 0.08 to 0.10
indicate mediocre ﬁt, and those greater than 0.10 indicate poor ﬁt (MacCallum et. al. 1996).
26These indices are based on comparison with a null model predicting all covariances to be zero. The
NFI relates the chi-square of this null model to the chi-square of the actual model. It should be greater
than 0.90. The GFI and the AGFI compare the loss function of the null model with the loss function
of the actual model, with AGFI adjusting for the complexity of the model.
27In the economics literature the normalized coeﬃcients are sometimes multiplied by the corresponding
(standardized) data to derive an estimate of the latent variable, (Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984),
and Loayza (1996)). The results reported are robust to this procedure. We have opted, however, to use
the methodology of J¨ oreskog (2000) which uses more structural information.
12of these patterns over time.
4.2 Corruption 1976-1997
We now explore how corruption has changed over time since 1976. However, in doing
this, there are several drawbacks. First, the further back in time, the less data there is
available in terms of country coverage. For each sub-time period the model is estimated,
the sample size reduces considerably (for the periods 1986-1990, 1981-1985 and 1976-
1980 the sample reduces to 91, 77 and 65 countries, respectively). The second issue
relates to the countries we lose from the sample; typically those countries will be the less
developed ones where corruption may be expected to be high.28 In this case, it is likely
that the estimated model will give less statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the earlier
periods.
To deal with these issues, the basic speciﬁcation of the model included all causal vari-
ables discussed in Section 3. However, for diﬀerent time periods, not all variables were
statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, to provide consistency in our speciﬁcation across
sub-periods, we estimate a more parsimonious version of the model to the one that was
presented in Table 1.29 In choosing the most parsimonious version of the model, we
relied on the variables that would be statistically signiﬁcant across all time periods and
the goodness-of-ﬁt statistics. While all the indicator variables continued to perform well,
the number of statistically signiﬁcant causes was reduced to two: the rule of law and the
school enrolment rate. The results for the estimation of the model for each sub-period
(including the 1991-97 period) are presented in columns 2-4 of Table 3.
The estimated parameters for both the causal and indicator variables are fairly consistent
across each sub-period. The signs of the estimated parameters continue to hold (as in
the less parsimonious model for 1991-1997 presented in Table 1) while the parameter
values show little variation. Table 3 also reports goodness-of-ﬁt statistics for our four
models. The chi-square test of exact ﬁt accepts all models at least at the ﬁve percent
level of signiﬁcance. The RMSEA is smaller than 0.05 in the most recent period and
still acceptable in the other three speciﬁcations. The other indices that provide evidence
of model ﬁt (the GFI, the AGFI and the NFI), all indicate values relatively close to
1. Based on these goodness-of-ﬁt statistics, we conclude that our model ﬁts the sample
data fairly well when estimated for each sub-period.
28The exception is Switzerland where data on capital account restrictions are not available for earlier
periods. This is because Switzerland only became a member of the IMF in 1992.
29Note that for the most recent period, the correlation between the full and the parsimonious model
is 0.998. The quality of our results is thus not reduced by estimating a more parsimonious model.
13The indices of corruption derived from those estimates are presented in the last four
columns of Table 3. There are two important results. First, levels of corruption seem to
be fairly consistent over time, as are the relative positions of countries.30 Second, there
are some obvious regional patterns. Overall corruption in Western Europe decreased
since the mid-70s, whereas corruption increased in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin Amer-
ica/Caribbean. The pattern is more mixed in East Asia Paciﬁc, where the huge decrease
in Japan’s level of corruption reduces the average level for the region, and the Middle
East/North Africa, with decreases in corruption in Israel and Malta and increases in
most other countries. The averages for the period 1976-1980 are -0.13 (West Europe),
-0.01 (East Asia Paciﬁc), 0.05 (Middle East and North Africa), 0.7 (Latin America and
Caribbean), 0.1 (sub-Saharan Africa) and 0.1 (South Asia). It is also worth noting
that, of the 10 most corrupt countries reported in Table 3, all witnessed an increase in
corruption since the 1980s.
There are three ways to test for the validity of a structural model (Bollen, 1989). Firstly,
it is necessary to examine the ﬁt of the model. Secondly, variables related to the latent
variable in the theoretical literature should have the expected impact. Thirdly, the ob-
tained latent variable should be correlated with other measures of the same concept. We
have dealt with the ﬁrst two validity tests above. To further improve our conﬁdence
that the latent variable really measures corruption, we calculated the correlation of the
resulting indices with the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International
(which is highly correlated with other perception-based indices). The resulting corre-
lations for the respective time periods range from 0.80 for the period 1976-80 to 0.83
for all models in 1991-97. Consequently, we can be reasonably conﬁdent that our latent
variable is picking up the ranking of corruption across countries.
5 Economic losses due to corruption
By benchmarking the index to estimates of the losses due to corruption from an external
source, we can derive a value for each of the countries in terms of the losses as a percentage
of GDP per capita that arise due to corruption. This benchmarking exercise raises
obvious challenges: since there are no published estimates of the losses due to corruption
available, one has to search for suitable alternatives. Therefore, the choice of unit on
which to benchmark is to some extent arbitrary. Nevertheless similar benchmarking
exercises are common in the literature. Loayza (1996), for instance, uses the VAT evasion
rate to benchmark the shadow economy, whereas Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) use
30In interpreting the ranking one has to keep in mind that in many cases a country moves up or down
in the ranking because of missing data for other countries.
14two external estimates for the shadow economy. With respect to corruption, one such
possibility is the cost of entry as a percentage of GDP per capita estimated by Djankov et.
al. (2002) who show that the regulation of entry in terms of setting up new businesses (in
the form of number of procedures to be completed and the time involved in meeting these
requirements) is associated with higher corruption.31 However, the choice of countries
on which to benchmark on is arbitrary and, of course, the results are rather sensitive to
this choice.
We choose to benchmark our index of corruption on two observations from Table 3
of Djankov et. al. (2002) – countries which are shown to be among the least corrupt
according to our corruption index. We do not employ Switzerland and Japan because the
values for the estimated index for those countries are extremely negative, as compared to
the rest of the sample. We thus benchmark on Norway and Denmark. The benchmarking
exercise allows us to derive the distance in terms of changes in the value of our corruption
index. The results are presented in Table 4.
The ﬁrst column reports the losses due to corruption as a percentage of per capita GDP
over the same period. The results suggest that the losses due to corruption can vary
considerably from 11.20 percent of per capita GDP in Norway to around 67 percent of
per capita GDP in Guinea-Bissau.32 On average, countries in West Europe lose about
24 percent in per capita GDP due to corruption. In East Asia and Paciﬁc, corruption
leads to 44 percent lower GDP per capita, while the other regions exhibit even higher
losses. The corresponding ﬁgures for other regions are: Middle East and North Africa
(54 percent), Latin America and Caribbean (58 percent), East Europe and Central Asia
(59 percent), sub-Saharan Africa (63 percent) and South Asia (63 percent).33 Taken
together, these results conﬁrm that corruption is indeed a signiﬁcant economic problem
and suggest that the incidence of corruption is one of the most signiﬁcant barriers to
31A word of clariﬁcation is in order here. One may argue that the variable ‘to set up a business’ could
be either a cause or an indicator of corruption. Estimation of the model shows that as a cause it is
insigniﬁcant. As a candidate indicator for the empirical analysis it cannot be used too. This is because
it is available for only the mid-1990s and covers only 85 countries falling short of the sample size (see
also footnote 21). If the variable is included as an indicator to the full model of Table 1, the results are
almost unchanged but there is a loss of data on 35 countries. As an indicator, it is signiﬁcant at the 10
percent level, with the expected positive sign. Issues relating to the costs of corruption that use data
for more recent periods are addressed in Dreher et. al. (2004).
32Note that Switzerland and Japan have been excluded from Table 4. This is because the index value
for these two countries signiﬁcantly deviates from the average and therefore we do not consider the
results for these countries to be reliable. In fact the losses derived for these countries are negative.
33Though these estimates seem to be particularly high, they are nevertheless consistent with the World
Bank’s recent observation on the impact of corruption across countries. As noted in the introduction,
the World Bank estimates that, in some cases, tackling corruption and mis-governance could increase
income by as much as 400 percent.
15economic development.
With respect to the changes of the losses in corruption over time the results, of course,
correspond to the developments of the index as outlined in Section 4.2. These results
are consistent with the concerns that corruption has become more pervasive in poor
developing countries and that it increased following the move to a market economy in
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and China.34
6 Concluding remarks
This paper was predicated on the fact that the current policy focus on corruption around
the world as well as most empirical studies of corruption employ perception-based indices
to gauge the ranking between the most and less corrupt countries. While informative,
there are several problems in the interpretation of these indices. Arguably, the most
fundamental criticism is that they do not provide any indication of the losses that are
likely to arise from corruption which is of fundamental importance in the current focus
on how corruption inhibits economic development. To this end, we employed a struc-
tural model of corruption that simultaneously deals with the causes and indicators of
corruption within a uniﬁed framework.
There are several attractions to using this framework to estimating corruption. First, the
model is explicitly causal in nature such that the ranking one retrieves across countries
is tied to the causal variables that were used to estimate the model. As such, the model
produces a cardinal index of corruption rather than one that is solely ordinal. Second,
benchmarking the estimated index on speciﬁc countries using a proxy for the losses due
to corruption, we can then derive losses as a percentage of GDP for all countries in our
sample. This is an explicit gauge to evaluate how much corruption matters. Finally,
dependent on data availability, the model can be estimated over diﬀerent sub-periods to
assess how corruption has changed over time for each country.
The key results from the paper is that the losses due to corruption are generally high. In
developed countries, the losses due to corruption as a percentage of per capita GDP are
comparably low (22.26) in the period 1991-97; in developing and transition countries,
the losses are considerably higher particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where the average
loss amounts to over 60 percent of per capita GDP. This suggests that corruption is quite
rightly a major policy issue for developing countries. The results suggest that since the
34Varese (1997), for example, discusses the likely increase in corruption in Russia following the intro-
duction of market reforms while Johnston and Hao (1995) discuss the apparent ‘surge’ in corruption in
China following liberalization.
161980s, the losses due to corruption have decreased in West Europe, exhibited a positive
trend in Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, sub-Saharan
Africa and have remaind fairly constant in East Asia and Paciﬁc. As such, the focus of
corruption as a barrier to economic development is clearly warranted.
The methodology applied in this paper holds much promise for future research in the
empirical analysis of corruption. For example, the impact of economic, political and
economic reform on corruption is a potentially fruitful avenue of research and one that
has received some attention for those who identify the role of institutions as a determi-
nant of economic development (Acemolgu et. al. (2001) and Rodrik et. al. (2002)).
Moreover, the methodology reported here can be extended to the case where some of
the exogenous variables are themselves inherently latent and interrelated (for example,
with institutional reform, the rule of law and the hidden economy) which interact with
the endogenous latent variable of corruption. For example, in measuring the size of the
hidden economy which has been a previous focus of researchers using MIMIC, the es-
timates are likely to be picking up aspects of corruption (and vice versa). Separating
these two aspects will provide a more accurate assessment of the relative importance of
each of them.
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Table 1: Model estimates, 1991-1997
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Causes
Rule of law -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06
(2:41¤¤) (2:33¤¤) (2:04¤¤) (2:10¤¤)
School enrolment -0.14 -0.15 -0.12 -0.09
( 2:61¤) (2:66¤) (2:43¤¤) (2:36¤¤)
Latitude -0.04 -0.03
(1:78¤¤¤) (1:72¤¤¤)
Legal German origin -0.09 -0.09
(2:56¤¤) (2:59¤¤)
Age of democracy -0.09 -0.09
(2:35¤¤) (2:47¤¤)
Indicators
Cement 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Private credit -2.83 -2.97 -2.99 -2.77
(2:85¤) (2:78¤) (2:70¤) (2:75¤)
GDP per capita -3.41 -3.47 -3.53 -3.32
(2:90¤) (2:82¤) (2:74¤) (2:79¤)
Restrictions 2.57 2.63 2.74 2.50
(2:81¤) (2:74¤) (2:67¤) (2:70¤)
Number of countries 102 103 102 98
p-value 0.40 0.36 0.80 0.22
RMSEA 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.05
GFI 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.95
AGFI 0.92 0.92 0.95 0.89
NFI 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.97
Notes:
1. t-statistics in parentheses.
2. Levels of signiﬁcance: 1 percent (¤), 5 percent (¤¤), 10 percent (¤¤¤).
18Table 2: Ranking and indices of corruption across all model speciﬁcations.
Country 1997 1997P 1990P 1985P 1980P
Switzerland 1 (-0.9165) 1 (-0.9047) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Japan 2 (-0.8801) 2 (-0.8705) 1 (-0.6238) 1 (-0.5633) 1 (-0.276)
Norway 3 (-0.5489) 3 (-0.5346) 4 (-0.3966) 4 (-0.3646) 4 (-0.1984)
Denmark 4 (-0.5409) 4 (-0.5232) 2 (-0.4231) 2 (-0.3924) 2 (-0.2405)
Germany 5 (-0.5193) 5 (-0.5142) 3 (-0.4007) n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 6 (-0.5005) 6 (-0.5058) 7 (-0.3635) 6 (-0.3502) 5 (-0.1889)
Austria 7 (-0.4953) 7 (-0.4904) 8 (-0.3548) 5 (-0.3507) 8 (-0.1821)
Sweden 8 (-0.472) 8 (-0.4723) 5 (-0.3898) 3 (-0.3725) 3 (-0.2012)
United States 9 (-0.4615) 9 (-0.4589) 6 (-0.3635) 7 (-0.3404) 6 (-0.183)
France 10 (-0.4322) 10 (-0.4281) 10 (-0.3226) 8 (-0.3349) 7 (-0.1825)
Belgium 11 (-0.4209) 11 (-0.4148) 12 (-0.2665) 11 (-0.2524) 9 (-0.1493)
Hong Kong, China n.a. 12 (-0.3926) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Finland 12 (-0.3894) 13 (-0.386) 9 (-0.3369) 9 (-0.3) 11 (-0.1471)
Singapore 14 (-0.3419) 14 (-0.3452) 15 (-0.1988) 13 (-0.178) 19 (-0.0404)
Iceland 13 (-0.3471) 15 (-0.3323) 11 (-0.2874) 10 (-0.2651) 12 (-0.1449)
United Kingdom 15 (-0.2864) 16 (-0.2948) 14 (-0.2256) 14 (-0.1598) 16 (-0.0751)
Canada 17 (-0.2583) 17 (-0.2614) 13 (-0.2288) 12 (-0.2322) 13 (-0.1167)
Australia 16 (-0.2588) 18 (-0.259) 16 (-0.1901) 15 (-0.1546) 14 (-0.0858)
Italy 18 (-0.2206) 19 (-0.2207) 17 (-0.1608) 16 (-0.1433) 15 (-0.0778)
Ireland 19 (-0.2009) 20 (-0.203) 21 (-0.0986) 19 (-0.0845) 20 (-0.0302)
New Zealand 20 (-0.1909) 21 (-0.1991) 18 (-0.1532) 17 (-0.1336) 17 (-0.0712)
Spain 21 (-0.1382) 22 (-0.1436) 20 (-0.1043) n.a. n.a.
Kuwait 22 (-0.1191) 23 (-0.1212) 19 (-0.1061) 18 (-0.1214) 10 (-0.1482)
Israel 23 (-0.0924) 24 (-0.0872) 23 (-0.0769) 20 (-0.0828) 18 (-0.0435)
Cyprus 24 (-0.0682) 25 (-0.0748) 24 (-0.0253) 24 (0.0151) n.a.
Portugal 25 (-0.0346) 26 (-0.043) 26 (-0.009) 23 (-0.0213) 22 (-0.003)
Korea, Republic 26 (-0.0334) 27 (-0.0419) 28 (0.0073) 26 (0.0552) 26 (0.0491)
Bahamas n.a. 28 (-0.02) 22 (-0.0856) n.a. n.a.
Bahrain 27 (0.001) 29 (-0.0054) 27 (0.0002) 22 (-0.0294) n.a.
Greece 28 (0.0139) 30 (0.0155) 25 (-0.0183) 21 (-0.0392) 21 (-0.03)
Malta n.a. 31 (0.029) 29 (0.0383) 30 (0.0711) n.a.
Malaysia 29 (0.0866) 32 (0.0677) 31 (0.0426) 27 (0.058) 32 (0.068)
Czech Republic n.a. 33 (0.0856) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina 30 (0.0966) 34 (0.092) 35 (0.0845) 28 (0.061) 23 (0.0155)
Slovenia n.a. 35 (0.1001) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Barbados n.a. 36 (0.103) 30 (0.0412) n.a. n.a.
Oman 31 (0.1259) 37 (0.118) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Trinidad & Tobago 32 (0.1411) 38 (0.1292) 34 (0.0835) 31 (0.0716) 27 (0.0492)
Panama 34 (0.1485) 39 (0.1321) 33 (0.0802) 29 (0.0613) 28 (0.0496)
cont.ed
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Country 1997 1997P 1990P 1985P 1980P
Uruguay 33 (0.1414) 40 (0.136) 32 (0.0714) 25 (0.0479) 25 (0.0449)
Thailand 35 (0.1522) 41 (0.1374) 40 (0.1156) 37 (0.1325) 39 (0.0868)
South Africa 36 (0.1809) 42 (0.1762) 37 (0.1011) n.a. n.a.
Chile 37 (0.1822) 43 (0.1803) 41 (0.1256) 34 (0.1178) 33 (0.0775)
Indonesia 40 (0.1988) 44 (0.1806) 44 (0.1334) 41 (0.1476) 55 (0.1008)
Mexico 38 (0.1913) 45 (0.1829) 48 (0.1463) 39 (0.1402) 30 (0.0612)
Mauritius 39 (0.192) 46 (0.1849) 45 (0.1355) 50 (0.1624) n.a.
Tunisia 42 (0.2057) 47 (0.1957) 43 (0.1293) n.a. n.a.
Hungary 41 (0.1997) 48 (0.1991) 36 (0.0868) 35 (0.1228) n.a.
Jordan 45 (0.2152) 49 (0.2051) 38 (0.1133) 33 (0.113) 38 (0.0853)
Costa Rica 43 (0.2118) 50 (0.2062) 51 (0.1552) 45 (0.1531) 31 (0.0653)
Venezuela 44 (0.2135) 51 (0.2104) 39 (0.1133) 32 (0.0803) 24 (0.0361)
Slovak Republic n.a. 52 (0.2184) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Peru 48 (0.2275) 53 (0.2185) 67 (0.1754) 44 (0.1511) 35 (0.0791)
Jamaica 47 (0.2272) 54 (0.22) 47 (0.1436) 40 (0.1459) 36 (0.0797)
Brazil 46 (0.2216) 55 (0.225) 42 (0.1271) 36 (0.1271) 29 (0.0601)
China 50 (0.2361) 56 (0.2256) 46 (0.1425) n.a. n.a.
Turkey 49 (0.2325) 57 (0.2286) 49 (0.1472) n.a. n.a.
Philippines 51 (0.2455) 58 (0.2362) 63 (0.1739) 42 (0.1478) 41 (0.0871)
Guatemala 54 (0.2474) 59 (0.2389) 58 (0.1681) 56 (0.1735) 37 (0.0832)
Paraguay 52 (0.2461) 60 (0.2401) 69 (0.1759) 54 (0.1717) 49 (0.0929)
Morocco 53 (0.2474) 61 (0.2401) 68 (0.1756) 59 (0.1799) 52 (0.0965)
Bolivia 56 (0.2548) 62 (0.2468) 64 (0.1749) 73 (0.2053) 51 (0.0957)
Nicaragua 59 (0.2624) 63 (0.2523) 88 (0.207) 61 (0.1808) 45 (0.09)
Colombia 55 (0.2544) 64 (0.2533) 60 (0.1715) 52 (0.1649) 40 (0.087)
Sri Lanka 60 (0.2645) 65 (0.2554) 72 (0.1789) 63 (0.185) 58 (0.1026)
Poland 57 (0.2565) 66 (0.2575) 54 (0.1585) n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea 61 (0.2673) 67 (0.2605) 53 (0.1573) 51 (0.1644) n.a.
Botswana 58 (0.2581) 68 (0.2617) 61 (0.1716) 70 (0.1992) n.a.
Haiti 66 (0.2735) 69 (0.264) 73 (0.1791) 58 (0.1761) 53 (0.0971)
Ecuador 62 (0.2684) 70 (0.2652) 62 (0.1729) 48 (0.1619) 42 (0.0884)
Cote d’Ivoire 65 (0.2731) 71 (0.2666) 52 (0.1561) 38 (0.1396) n.a.
Dominican Republic 63 (0.2698) 72 (0.2668) 59 (0.1708) 55 (0.1732) 47 (0.0914)
El Salvador 64 (0.2708) 73 (0.2668) 79 (0.1926) n.a. 44 (0.0886)
Honduras 67 (0.2742) 74 (0.2676) 65 (0.1749) 53 (0.1713) 43 (0.0885)
Senegal 68 (0.2771) 75 (0.27) 55 (0.1587) 43 (0.148) 48 (0.0927)
Guyana 70 (0.2789) 76 (0.2746) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Egypt 69 (0.2787) 77 (0.2753) 74 (0.1796) 65 (0.1895) 60 (0.1047)
Cameroon 73 (0.2861) 78 (0.2806) 57 (0.168) 46 (0.1543) 50 (0.0948)
cont.ed
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Country 1997 1997P 1990P 1985P 1980P
Niger 75 (0.289) 79 (0.2814) 71 (0.1775) 68 (0.1958) 62 (0.1116)
Kenya 74 (0.289) 80 (0.2839) 70 (0.1764) 57 (0.1744) 57 (0.1018)
Bulgaria 72 (0.2859) 81 (0.2848) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Namibia 71 (0.2821) 82 (0.2862) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Zimbabwe 77 (0.291) 83 (0.2876) 82 (0.1976) 64 (0.1891) 56 (0.1013)
Benin 79 (0.2934) 84 (0.2876) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Pakistan 78 (0.2932) 85 (0.289) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Iran 76 (0.2892) 86 (0.2901) 56 (0.1634) 49 (0.1621) 34 (0.0778)
Bangladesh 81 (0.2959) 87 (0.2908) n.a. n.a. n.a.
India 83 (0.2961) 88 (0.2918) 66 (0.1753) 60 (0.1801) 59 (0.1033)
Mali 84 (0.2982) 89 (0.2929) 78 (0.1898) n.a. n.a.
Congo, Republic 82 (0.2959) 90 (0.2933) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Uganda 86 (0.3003) 91 (0.2949) 84 (0.2021) 74 (0.2131) n.a.
Togo 85 (0.2989) 92 (0.295) 75 (0.1807) 62 (0.1824) 54 (0.0998)
Algeria 80 (0.2947) 93 (0.2959) 50 (0.1509) 47 (0.1564) 46 (0.0901)
Sierra Leone 89 (0.3025) 94 (0.2971) 76 (0.187) 71 (0.2049) n.a.
Ukraine 87 (0.3004) 95 (0.3001) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Romania 88 (0.3017) 96 (0.3029) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Malawi 91 (0.3105) 97 (0.3067) 81 (0.1959) 67 (0.1933) n.a.
Madagascar 90 (0.3103) 98 (0.3074) 77 (0.189) n.a. n.a.
Chad 92 (0.3166) 99 (0.3143) 86 (0.2039) 72 (0.205) n.a.
Zambia 93 (0.3186) 100 (0.3178) 85 (0.2022) n.a. n.a
Ghana 94 (0.3198) 101 (0.3188) 91 (0.2125) 77 (0.2221) 63 (0.1119)
Congo, Dem. Rep. n.a. 102 (0.3201) 87 (0.2047) 75 (0.2146) 65 (0.1143)
Central African Rep. 95 (0.3211) 103 (0.3202) 83 (0.2011) 69 (0.1991) n.a.
Syria 96 (0.3261) 104 (0.329) 89 (0.2092) 76 (0.2154) 64 (0.1135)
Nigeria 97 (0.3326) 105 (0.334) 80 (0.1941) 66 (0.1926) 61 (0.1092)
Guinea-Bissau 98 (0.3424) 106 (0.3453) 90 (0.2113) n.a. n.a.
Notes:
1. The subscript P denotes the parsimonious model.
2. The ranking and indices of corruption across model speciﬁcations has been sorted
according to the ranking and index of the parsimonious model of 1997.
21Table 3: Model estimates across diﬀerent time periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1991-97 1986-90 1981-85 1976-80
Causes
Rule of law -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.05
(2:35¤¤) (2:48¤¤) (2:04¤¤) (2:51¤¤)
School enrolment -0.16 -0.10 -0.11 -0.16
( 2:67¤) (2:51¤¤) (2:06¤¤) (3:65¤)
Indicators
Cement 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Private credit -2.88 -3.76 -3.34 -3.55
(2:82¤) (2:65¤) (2:06¤¤) (3:53¤)
GDP per capita -3.31 -4.71 -4.64 -4.79
(2:86¤) (2:70¤) (2:12¤¤) (3:86¤)
Restrictions 2.57 3.30 3.17 2.23
(2:78¤) (2:57¤¤) (2:02¤¤) (2:64¤)
Number of countries 106 91 77 65
p-value 0.79 0.09 0.13 0.26
RMSEA 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.06
GFI 0.99 0.95 0.95 0.95
AGFI 0.96 0.87 0.86 0.87
NFI 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.96
Notes:
1. t-statistics in parentheses.
2. Levels of signiﬁcance: 1 percent (¤), 5 percent (¤¤), 10 percent (¤¤¤).
22Table 4: Economic loss of corruption for the parsimonious speciﬁcation.
Country 1997P 1990P 1985P 1980P
Norway 11.2 19.92 21.93 32.44
Denmark 11.92 18.24 20.18 29.78
Germany 12.49 19.65 n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 13.02 22.01 22.84 33.04
Austria 13.99 22.56 22.82 33.47
Sweden 15.13 20.35 21.44 32.26
United States 15.98 22.01 23.46 33.41
France 17.92 24.59 23.81 33.44
Belgium 18.77 28.13 29.03 35.54
Hong Kong, China 20.17 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Finland 20.58 23.69 26.02 35.68
Singapore 23.16 32.41 33.73 42.42
Iceland 23.98 26.82 28.22 35.82
United Kingdom 26.35 30.72 34.87 40.23
Canada 28.46 30.51 30.3 37.6
Australia 28.61 32.96 35.21 39.55
Italy 31.03 34.81 35.92 40.06
Ireland 32.15 38.74 39.64 43.06
New Zealand 32.39 35.29 36.53 40.47
Spain 35.9 38.38 n.a. n.a.
Kuwait 37.31 38.27 37.3 35.61
Israel 39.46 40.12 39.74 42.22
Cyprus 40.24 43.37 45.93 n.a.
Portugal 42.25 44.4 43.62 44.78
Korea, Republic 42.33 45.44 48.46 48.07
Bahamas 43.71 39.56 n.a. n.a.
Bahrain 44.63 44.98 43.12 n.a.
Greece 45.95 43.81 42.49 43.08
Malta 46.81 47.39 49.46 n.a.
Malaysia 49.25 47.66 48.64 49.27
Czech Republic 50.38 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Argentina 50.78 50.31 48.83 45.95
Slovenia 51.29 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Barbados 51.48 47.57 n.a. n.a.
Oman 52.42 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Trinidad & Tobago 53.14 50.25 49.49 48.08
Panama 53.32 50.04 48.84 48.1
Uruguay 53.56 49.48 48 47.81
Thailand 53.65 52.28 53.34 50.46
South Africa 56.1 51.36 n.a. n.a.
cont.ed
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Country 1997P 1990P 1985P 1980P
Chile 56.36 52.91 52.42 49.87
Indonesia 56.38 53.4 54.29 51.34
Mexico 56.53 54.21 53.83 48.84
Mauritius 56.66 53.53 55.23 n.a.
Tunisia 57.33 53.14 n.a. n.a.
Hungary 57.55 50.46 52.73 n.a.
Jordan 57.93 52.13 52.11 50.36
Costa Rica 58 54.77 54.64 49.1
Venezuela 58.26 52.13 50.05 47.25
Slovak Republic 58.77 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Peru 58.77 56.05 54.52 49.97
Jamaica 58.87 54.04 54.19 50.01
Brazil 59.19 53 53 48.77
China 59.23 53.97 n.a. n.a.
Turkey 59.41 54.27 n.a. n.a.
Philippines 59.89 55.95 54.31 50.47
Guatemala 60.06 55.59 55.93 50.23
Paraguay 60.14 56.08 55.82 50.84
Morocco 60.14 56.06 56.34 51.07
Bolivia 60.56 56.02 57.94 51.01
Nicaragua 60.91 58.05 56.39 50.66
Colombia 60.98 55.81 55.39 50.47
Sri Lanka 61.11 56.27 56.66 51.45
Poland 61.24 54.98 n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea 61.43 54.91 55.36 n.a.
Botswana 61.51 55.81 57.56 n.a.
Haiti 61.65 56.29 56.1 51.1
Ecuador 61.73 55.89 55.2 50.55
Cote d’Ivoire 61.81 54.83 53.79 n.a.
Dominican Republic 61.83 55.76 55.91 50.75
El Salvador 61.83 57.14 n.a. 50.57
Honduras 61.88 56.02 55.79 50.56
Senegal 62.03 55 54.32 50.83
Guyana 62.32 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Egypt 62.36 56.32 56.95 51.58
Cameroon 62.7 55.59 54.72 50.96
Niger 62.75 56.19 57.34 52.02
Kenya 62.91 56.12 55.99 51.4
cont.ed
24Table 4 cont.ed.
Country 1997P 1990P 1985P 1980P
Bulgaria 62.96 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Namibia 63.05 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Zimbabwe 63.14 57.46 56.92 51.37
Benin 63.14 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Pakistan 63.23 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Iran 63.3 55.29 55.22 49.88
Bangladesh 63.34 n.a. n.a. n.a.
India 63.41 56.04 56.35 51.5
Mali 63.48 56.96 n.a. n.a.
Congo, Republic 63.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Uganda 63.6 57.74 58.44 n.a.
Togo 63.61 56.39 56.5 51.27
Algeria 63.66 54.51 54.85 50.67
Sierra Leone 63.74 56.78 57.92 n.a.
Ukraine 63.93 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Romania 64.11 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Malawi 64.35 57.35 57.19 n.a.
Madagascar 64.39 56.91 n.a. n.a.
Chad 64.83 57.85 57.92 n.a.
Zambia 65.05 57.75 n.a. n.a.
Ghana 65.11 58.39 59 52.04
Congo, Dem. Rep. 65.19 57.9 58.53 52.19
Central African Republic 65.2 57.68 57.55 n.a.
Syria 65.75 58.19 58.58 52.14
Nigeria 66.07 57.24 57.14 51.87
Guinea-Bissau 66.79 58.32 n.a. n.a.
Notes:
1. The subscript P denotes the parsimonious model.
2. The losses of corruption have been sorted according to the ranking of the parsimonious
model of 1997.
25Appendix
The appendix provides the deﬁnitions of the variables and their sources.
Variables used in tables 1 and 3
Age of democracy: Number of years since 1900 a country has a democracy score
continuously greater than zero. Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2000).
Cement: Cement consumption measured in thousand tons adjusted by GDP and
population density. Source: Cembureau (1998, 1999).
GDP per capita: Domestic product divided by mid-year population. Source: World
Bank (2003).
Latitude: Distance in degrees from the equator, Easterly and Sewadeh (2001).
Legal origin: Dummies for British, French, German and Socialist legal origin. Source:
Easterly and Sewadeh (2001).
Private credit: Private credit by deposit money banks and other ﬁnancial institutions
as a share of GDP. Source: Beck et. al. (1999).
Restrictions: Range 0 (no restrictions) to 4 (fully restricted). Consists of dummies
for the existence of payments restrictions, multiple exchange rates, surrender re-
quirements and restrictions on current transactions. Source: Dreher and Siemers
(2003). This is a continuous variables, since it is averaged over seven (for the period
1991-1997) and ﬁve years (for the periods 1976-1990).
Rule of law: 0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high) score for the quality of the legal system and
property rights. Source: Gwartney et. al. (2003).
School enrolment rate: Ratio of total enrolment to the population of the age group
that oﬃcially corresponds to the level of education shown. Secondary education
completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary level. Source:
World Bank (2003).
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